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CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
Diplomatic protection is often invoked by citizens of one coun-
try in cases arising out of contracts entered into with citizens of
another, or with a foreign government. With the constant growth
in international intercourse and the exploitation of backward coun-
tries by foreign capital, this class of cases has assumed large pro-
portions and has given rise to many perplexing and delicate diplo-
matic situations. The foreign offices of some of the more important
Governments have differentiated these claims from tortious claims
arising out of direct injuries to the person or property of their
citizens committed by an authority of the state, either by declin-
ing to interpose in behalf of their contracting citizens or else by
exercising more careful scrutiny than ordinarily over a cause of
action which has its origin in contract. Fundamentally it is the
denial of justice' which is the necessary condition for the inter-
position of a government on behalf of its citizen prejudiced by
breach of contract. Before a claim originating in a contract can,
as a general rule, come within the category of a denial of justice,
it must have been submitted to the courts for such judicial de-
termination as is provided by the local law or in the contract.
Until such submission, the government's right of interposition has
not yet accrued. The qualifications of this principle we shall con-
sider hereafter.
There are three important classes of contract claims: first,
those arising out of contracts concluded between individuals, citi-
zens of different countries; second, those arising out of contracts
between the citizen abroad and a foreign government; and third,
claims arising out of the unpaid bonds of a government held by
the citizen of another. The failure of some publicists clearly to
distinguish these classes in their discussion of the subject, espe-
cially the failure to distinguish. the second from the third class,
has brought about some confusion. When they state, as many
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of them do, that on principle that there can be no intervention in
claims arising out of contract, they really mean to confine their
assertion to the case of claims arising out of unpaid bonds and not
contracts in general. This distinction is important inasmuch as
there is far less reason for governmental intervention to secure the
payment of defaulted bonds of a foreign government than there
is in the case of breaches of concession and similar contracts, as
we shall see hereafter.
Hall fails properly to note the distinction between contract and
other claims. He recognizes that there is a difference in the prac-
tice of governments in supporting claims arising out of a default
of a foreign state in the payment of interest or capital of loans
made to it, and the complaints of persons sustaining injury in other
ways. He admits that in the former case governments generally
decline interposition, whereas in the latter it is a matter of ex-
pediency whether in the particular case their right of interposi-
tion shall be exercised. After giving the reasons why public loans
should not become a cause of international intervention, he states
that fundamentally
"there is no difference in principle between wrongs inflicted by
breach of a monetary agreement and other wrongs for which the
state, as itself the wrongdoer, is immediately responsible."'
While the statement is technically correct, it is apt to be mislead-
ing, inasmuch as it treats ordinary contract claims and those aris-
ing out of tort as forming one class, whereas there is an essential
difference between them. This consists in the fact that in the
case of contractual claims the active notice taken by the state of
the wrong done its citizen is deferred until he has exhausted his
local judicial remedies and a denial of justice is established, where-
as in claims arising out of tort, if chargeable to a government au-
thority, interposition is generally immediate; and in the further
fact that wider discretion is exercised by the protecting state in
the enforcement of contractual claims than of those purely tortious
in origin.
Westlake is one of the few writers who properly distinguishes
the case of ordinary contract claims, for example, those arising
out of supplies furnished the government or out of concession con-
1Hall, International Law (6th ed.) 275-276. See also Findlay, commis-
sioner U. S.-Venezuelan commission of Dec. 5, 1885, who considered the
difference one in degree only. He believed that a contractual claim for
building a public work and one founded on non-payment of a public debt
are the same, both being voluntary engagements. Opinions of the Com-
mission (Washington, Gibson Bros., 1890) 335, Moore's Arb., 3650.
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CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
tracts concluded between a citizen and a foreign government, and
cases of unpaid bonds forming part of a public loan.
In the case of ordinary contract claims, he says,
"there is a petition of right, a court of claims, or an appro-
priate administrative tribunal before which to go. The case is
not essentially different from any other arising between man and
man. The foreigner who has contracted with the government has
not elected to place himself at its mercy, and the rule of equal treat-
ment with nationals requires that he shall have the full benefit of
the established procedure, while if in a rare instance there is no
such established procedure, or it proves to be a mockery, the other
rule of protecting subjects against a flagrant denial of justice also
comes in. But public loans are contracted by acts of a legislative
nature, and when their terms are afterwards modified to the dis--
advantage of the bondholders this is done by other acts of a legis-
lative nature, which are not questionable by any proceeding in the
country. If therefore the rule of equal treatment with nationals
be looked to, the foreign bondholder has no case unless he is dis-
criminated against. And if the rule of protecting subjects against
a flagrant denial of justice be looked to, the reduction of interest
or capital is always put on the ground of the inability of the coun-
try to pay more-a foreign government is scarcely able to de-
termine whether or how far that plea is true-supposing it to be
true, the provisions which all legislations contain for the relief of
insolvent debtors prove that honest inability to pay is regarded as
a title to consideration-and the holder of a bond enforceable only
through the intervention of his government is trying, when he
seeks that intervention, to exercise a different right from that of
a person whose complaint is the gross defect of a remedial process
which by general understanding ought to exist and be effective.
'2
Contracts between Individuals.
The first class of cases, contracts between individuals, can give
rise only to an action in the courts for breach of contract. The
government of the foreigner is in no wise concerned unless the
local courts deny or unduly delay justice, in which event the gov-
ernment's right of interposition rests on the denial of justice alone
and disregards the fact that the claim had its origin in a contract.
This rule has generally been followed by the governments of con-
tracting citizens, and has been applied by international commis-
sions.8
'Westlake, International Law, -vol. I (2nd ed.) 332-333.
'Smith (U. S.) v. Mexico, Act of Congress, Mar. 3, 1849, Moore's Arb..
3456; Rowland (U. S.) v. Mexico, Mar. 3, 1849, Moore's Arb., 3458;
Hayes (U. S.) v. Mexico, Mar. 3, 1849, Moore's Arb., 3456; Chase (U. S.)
v. Mexico, Moore's Arb., 3469-70; La Guaira Light & Power Co. (U. S.)
v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 19o3, Ralston I, 182.
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Contracts between Citizen Abroad and Foreign Government.
A more doubtful case arises where the contract has been con-
cluded between the citizen and the foreign government. We shall
riot here discuss the question of unpaid bonds, for the two, in spite
of their frequent treatment by writers as identical, are distinct
branches of the subject. The contracts now in question are such
as are made with the foreign government for the supply of mate-
rial, for the execution of public works, and for the exercise of
concessions of various kinds. Here again the general rule fol-
lowed by the United States, although not by all other govern-
ments, is that a contract claim can not give rise to the diplomatic in-
terposition of the government- unless, after an exhaustion of local
remedies, there has been a denial of justice, or some flagrant viola-
tion of international law. The use of good offices is, however, usu-
ally sanctioned. While the rule is fairly clear, its application and its
exceptions are vague, due principally to the fact that the inter-
vening government interprets for itself what is a denial of justice
and frequently concludes that harsh treatment of its contracting
citizen by the foreign government constitutes a tortious act which
takes the case out of the ordinary rule. Broadly speaking, we
might state the rule as follows: Diplomatic interposition will not
lie for the natural or anticipated consequences of the contractual
relation, but only for arbitrary incidents or results, such as a de-
nial of justice or flagrant violation of local or international law.4
There are several reasons why governments are and should be
less zealous in pressing the claims of their citizens arising out of
breach of contract than those arising out of some tortious act.
The first reason is that the citizen entering into a contract does so
voluntarily and takes into account the probabilities and possibilities
of performance by the foreign government. He has in contem-
plation all the ordinary risks which attend the execution of the
contract. In the second place, by going abroad, he submits im-
pliedly to the local law and the local judicial system. The contract
or the law provides remedies for breach of contract. These he
must pursue before his own government can become interested
'F. de Martens in his essay "Par la justice vers la paix," (PP. 30-31)
supports the rule of non-interference by the government until the claimant
lias appealed to the local courts and justice has been denied. Even then,
he suggests a preliminary judicial examination into the justice of the
claim by the government of the claimant. See also Martens' Trait6 de
droit international, vol. I, 446-447. See also Fiore, P. Nouveau droit int.
public (Paris, 1885, Antoine's trans.) § 651; Lomonaco, Diritto inter-
nazionale pubblico (Napoli, 1905) 218-219.
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in his case. In the third place, practically every civilized state may
be sued for breach of contract. Even the United States, which
renders itself less amenable to suit at the hands of injured indi-
viduals than perhaps any other country, recognizes its liability for
illegal breaches of contract.5 In England, a petition of right is
rarely refused; in the United States, the Court of Claims or similar
body in the states has jurisdiction; in France and some other coun-
tries, the Council of State or some administrative body is the
proper forum for suits against the State; in Latin America the
Supreme Court is generally given jurisdiction.
The exceptions to this requirement of exhausting local reme-
dies occur first, where the local judicial organization is so corrupt,
or the possibility of local remedy so remote, that it would be folly
to compel a citizen to submit his cause of action to local courts.
The fact that the protecting government determines for itself the
existence of these qualifying conditions renders the application
of the rule uncertain. Secondly, where the breach is one not
within the contemplation of the contracting parties, but partakes of
the nature of an arbitrary tort, the protecting government will re-
lieve its citizen from the ordinary rule of submission to local
courts. The position of the injured individual and the protecting
government is the same as in cases of ordinary tortious acts of the
defendant government and justifies interposition.
The early publicists seem to have justified reprisals by a gov-
ernment for default of obligations due its citizen on the part of
another government. Grotius appears to have sanctioned reprisals
for the collection of debts due to subjects from a foreign power
notwithstanding the claim to be thus satisfied was submitted to the
courts of the government in default and by them pronounced un-
founded1. Vattel similarly justified hostile action to enforce con-
tracts concluded between a citizen and a foreign government. But
Vattel admits that before the claimant nation proceeds to such
extremities (reprisals) it must be able to show that it
"has ineffectually demanded justice, or at least that [the claimant]
has every reason to think it would be vain . . . to demand it."7
'Revised Statutes § io5g, par. i; § io6o; § io68; Act of March 3, 1887
(Tucker Act) 24 Stat. L. 505, § i.
!.Grotius, De jure belli ac pads, 3, 2, 5; cf. 1, 5, 2 and 2, 25, I.
'Vattel, Law of Nations (Chitty-Ingraham edition, Phila., 1855) Bk. II,
Ch. 14, § 18, 214-216; Ch. 18, §§ 343, 347, 354. See also Wheaton, Interna-
tional Law (Lawrence's ed., 1863) 51o.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW.
From that time on, the conviction has gained ground that an
attempt to exhaust local justice must be shown before diplomatic
pressure or hostile action is warranted. Modern writers generally
agree that where the citizen has at his disposal the legal means of
asserting his rights and obtaining reparation of his injury by ju-
dicial proceedings, the interposition of his government is unjusti-
fied, for
"to secure by diplomacy what the individual might secure judically
is to be deemed highly reprehensible."18
As we shall see, contractual claims are among the first causes of
complaint now largely removed from the field of armed conflict,
through the adoption by the Second Hague Conference and the
general ratification of the convention for the limitation of force to
recover contract debts.
Coming now to the practice of governments we can not say that
the countries of continental Europe make any substantial distinc-
tion between claims arising out of contract and those arising out
of other acts. 9 The United States however, and at times Great
Britain, have limited their protection considerably in the case of
ordinary contract claims. The fact that the citizen entered volun-
tarily into the contract seems to have been a determining factor
in the policy of the United States not to interpose diplomatically
in behalf of its citizens prejudiced abroad through breach of a
contract concluded by them with a foreign government. John
Quincy Adams' statement as Secretary of State has been quoted
frequently by his successors in the Department of State. Adams'
ruling was as follows:
"With regard to the contracts of an individual born in one coun-
try with the Government of another, most especially when the
individual contracting is domiciliated in the country with whose
Government he contracts, and formed the contract voluntarily, for
his own private emolument and without the privity of the nation
under whose protection he has been born, he has no claim whatso-
ever to call upon the Government of his nativity to espouse his
'Fiore, P. Nouveau droit international public (Antoine's trans.) vol. I,
§ 651. Martens, Trait6 de droit international, 446.
'Germany, Italy and France have at times intervened diplomatically in
favor of their subjects in cases arising out of contract, without any
question as to the propriety of such action. Germany's and Italy's attitude
was shown in the action against Venezuela in 19o2. See Dulon in 38
Amer. Law Rev. 65o and Brook in 3o Law Mag. & Rev. I65. See also
case of Kronsberg, a German engineer, against Roumania in 1871, Tcher-
noff, Protection des nationaux A l'6tranger, 188; Martens' Trait6, I, 70.
See the French action against the Dominican Republic, 1894, For. ReL,
1895, I, 235-243, 397-402.
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claim, this Government having no right to compel that with which
he voluntarily contracted to the performance of that contract."'"
Mr. Marcy in 1856 made the following apt statement of the rule
of the Department of State:
"The Government of the United States is not bound to interfere
to secure the fulfillment of contracts made between their citizens
and foreign Governments, it being presumed that before entering'
into such contracts the disposition and ability of the foreign power
to perform its obligations was examined, and the risk of failure
taken into consideration.""
While diplomatic interposition or pressure is declined, the use
of friendly good offices by the diplomatic representatives of the
United States abroad is authorized. Secretary Fish expressed
as follows the practice of the Department in this respect:
"Our long-settled policy and practice has been to decline the
formal intervention of the Government except in cases of wrong
and injury to person and property, such as the common law de-
nominates torts and regards as inflicted by force, and not the re-
sults of voluntary engagements or contracts.
"In cases founded upon contract the practice of this Govern-
ment is to confine itself to allowing its minister to exert his
friendly good offices in recommending the claim to the equitable
consideration of the debtor without committing his own Govern-
ment to any ulterior proceedings.
1 2
What is meant by "good offices" and the extent to which they
may be exerted has on several occasions been construed by secre-
taries of state. Mr. Fish defined the use of "good offices" as a
direction to a diplomatic agent
"to investigate the subject, and if [he] shall find the facts as repre-
sented, [he] will seek an interview with the minister for foreign
affairs and request such explanations as it may be in his power to
afford."'13
"John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Mr. Salmon (April 29,
1823) Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., vol. 5, 4o3, quoted in Wharton II, 654,
Moore's Dig., VI, 708, and notes there cited. See also the Landreau case,
Sec'y. of State Bayard to Mr. Cowie (June 15, 1885) Moore's Dig., VI, 715;
and the Fiedler case, Mr. Bayard, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Jarvis (Mar. 22,
1886) Moore's Dig., VI, 715.
"Mr. Marcy, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Fowler (July 17, 1856) Wharton
Ii, 655.
'Mr. Fish, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Muller (May I6, 1871) Wharton II,
656, Moore's Dig., VI, 710. See the long list of cases cited by Wharton(II, 655) and by Moore (VI, 705-707) in support of the rule that "it is
not usual for the Government of the United States to interfere, except by
its good offices, for the prosecution of claims founded on contracts with
foreign governments."
"Mr. Fish, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Osborn (Mar. 4, 1876) Wharton II,
658, Moore's Dig., VI, 711.
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Good offices are in the nature of unofficial personal recommenda-
tions and are not tendered officially, although apparently the gov-
ernment may authorize or direct a diplomatic representative to ex-
tend them. Perhaps the best statement of the practice of the
United States in the matter of contract claims was made by
Secretary Bayard in 1885:
"It is not necessary to remind you that -an appeal by one sov-
ereign on behalf of a subject to obtain from another sovereign
the payment of a debt alleged to be due such subject is the exercise
of a very delicate and peculiar prerogative, which, by principles
definitely settled in this Department, is placed under the following
limitations.
"i. All that our Government undertakes, when the claim is
merely contractual, is to interpose its good offices; in other words,
to ask the attention of the foreign sovereign to the claim; and this
is only done when the claim is one susceptible of strong and clear
proof.
"2. If the sovereign appealed to denies the validity of the claim
or refuses its payment, the matter drops, since it is not consistent
with the dignity of the United States to press, after such a refusal
or denial, a contractual claim for the repudiation of which there is
by the law of nations no redress. * * *
"3. When the alleged debtor sovereign declares that his courts
are open to the pursuit of the claim, this by itself is a ground for a
refusal to interpose. Since the establishment of the Court of
Claims, for instance, the Government of the United States remands
all claims held abroad, as well as at home, to the action of that
court, and declines to accept for its executive department cogniz-
ance of matters which by its own system it assigns to the judiciary.
"4. When this Department has been appealed to for diplomatic
intervention of this class, and this intervention is refused, this re-
fusal is regarded as final unless after-discovered evidence be pre-
sented which, under the ordinary rules applied by the courts in
motions for a new trial, ought to change the result, or unless fraud
be shown in the concoction of the decision."14
Even good offices will, however, be refused
"when the debt was of a speculative character, or when it was in-
curred to aid the debtor government to make war on a country
with which the United States was at peace."'"
From this we may infer that the State Department takes some
official interest in the extension of good offices.
"Mr. Bayard, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Bispham (June 24, 1885) Wharton
II, 656, Moore's Dig., VI, 716.
'"Mr. Seward, Sec'y. of State, to Messrs. Leavitt & Co. (May 6, 1868)
Wharton II, 656, Moore's Dig., VI, 710.
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The United States will not promise protection in advance
to secure the execution of a contract between a citizen and a
foreign government. The American-China Development Company
in entering upon contracts with China requested such advance pro-
tection and alleged that the English investors in their enterprise
would receive such guaranty from the British foreign office. Sec-
retary of State Day gave as his reason for his unwillingness to
extend such a guaranty as the British government was said to
have extended, that the British Crown, exercising the executive
power in Great Britain, possesses both the war-making and the
treaty-making power, and is therefore authorized, in international
relations, to give guarantees and enter into engagements which the
Executive of the United States would not alone be competent to
assume.16
Secretary Marcy in 1855 gave a somewhat similar explanation
for the unwillingness of the United States to interfere officially in a
case of alleged breach by a foreign government of a contract with
citizens of the United States." The possibility of Congress de-
clining to support the action of the Executive does not, however,
appear to have been as prominently in the minds of other secre-
taries of state in dealing with international claims. While the
Department of State will rarely protest in advance against a pro-
posed law of a foreign country interfering merely with contractual
rights of American citizens, there have been occasions where such
action was taken."
The general belief that Great Britain does not in practice in-
terfere in claims arising out of contract, is erroneously based upon
the frequently quoted circular of Viscount Palmerston, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, directed in 1848 to .the British repre-
sentatives in foreign states.19 Palmerston declared that while the
government had the right to intervene, it was merely a question of
discretion with the British government whether the pecuniary
claims of subjects should be taken up or not by diplomatic negotia-
"Sec'y. of State Day, to Messrs. Cary & Whitridge (Aug. 24, 1898) in
the case of the American-China Development Co., Moore's Dig., VI, 288.
'Mr. Marcy, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Clay, Minister to Peru (May 24,
,855) Moore's Dig., VI, 709.
"Mr. Webster, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Letcher (August 24, I85O) pro-
testing against any violation by decree of the Tehuantepec concession,
adding that this would be regarded as a national grievance. Sen. Doc. 97,
32nd Cong., Ist Sess.
"The instruction in full is printed in Phillimore on International Law
(3rd ed., London, 1882) vol. 2, 9-11.
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tion, and "the decision of that question of discretion turns entirely
upon British and domestic considerations. ' 20  This language is
broad enough indeed to cover any class of claim, but it must be
understood that Palmerston's ruling was made with reference to
claims arising out of unpaid bonds of foreign states held by British
subjects, a case in which intervention is for various reasons, as we
shall show, even less justifiable than in the case of ordinary con-
tracts.
In applying the rule of refusing diplomatic interposition on
contract claims, the United States has always been careful to limit
its strict interpretation to cases entirely free from the qualifying
factors of a denial of justice or other tortious element. If in any
respect a denial of justice could be discerned in the case, or if any
arbitrary act or confiscatory breach of the contract had taken place,
the rule has been considered as no longer applying. A brief
enumeration of these exceptions to the rule may be made.
i. The United States has on several occasions insisted that its
citizens contracting abroad shall have free and fair access to the
courts and that the courts shall be so organized that the dispensing
of justice may be presumed. Secretary of State Evarts once said
that when a government does not hold itself amenable to judicial
suit by foreign claimants on contracts made with it, their claims
may be held to form an exception to the general rule as to con-
tracts, 21 and in a subsequent case in Hayti, the Lazare case, Mr.
Evarts added:
"the Government of the United States will insist on fair and im-
partial examination and adjudication by Hayti, without discrim-
ination as to nationality, of a contractual claim of a citizen of the
United States against Hayti. 22
Mr. Bayard in stating the general rule of refusal to press con-
tract claims excepted the case of discrimination against a citizen
by the debtor government and a denial of a judicial remedy against
'In fact, Great Britain has often interposed to redress breaches of
private contract. See, for example, the intervention in Bolivia in 1853,
Lord Clarendon to Mr. Lloyd, 56 St. Pap. 1003, and the criticism of Great
Britain's action by Baty, Int. Law, p. 127. Great Britain freely extends
good offices. See, for example, case of Dixon v. Portugal, 75 St. Pap. 1 196.
"Mr. Evarts to Mr. Gibbs (Oct. 31, 1877) Wharton II, 662. This state-
ment occurs in Mr. Evarts' opinion in the case of Sparrow v. Peru, Moore's
Dig., VI, 720. See also For. Rel., I895-6, Pt. II, io36-1055.
'Mr. Evarts to Mr. Langston, Minister to Hayti (Dec. i3, i877)
Moore's Dig., VI, 724. For a history of the Lazare case, see Moore's Arb.,
1749 et seq.
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it. 23 In the celebrated Idler case the fact that Venezuela had il-
legally invoked the remedy of reslitutio in integrum and by execu-
tive action had arbitrarily changed the personnel of the court and
district attorney for that particular case was held by the mixed
commission under the convention of Dec. 5, 1885 to have been
a denial of justice and to warrant an award.24
2. Cases have frequently occurred in which the contracts of
citizens of the United States with foreign governments were arbi-
trarily annulled by the contracting government without recourse
to a judicial determination of the contract or of the legitimacy
of its act. An act of this kind has generally been held by the De-
partment of State to be a confiscatory breach of the contract and
to warrant diplomatic interposition as in cases of tort. Any weak-
ening of the judicial remedy of the citizen has been held equally
to relieve the government from the ordinary rule of non-interven-
tion in contract cases. The rule in such cases has perhaps been
best stated by Lewis Cass, when Secretary of State, as follows:
"It is quite true, for example, that under ordinary circum-
stances when citizens of the United States go to a foreign country
they go with an implied understanding that they are to obey its
laws, and submit themselves, in good faith, to its established
tribunals. When they do business with its citizens, or make private
contracts there, it is not to be expected that either their own or
the foreign government is to be made a party to this business or
these contracts, or will undertake to determine any disputes to
which they may give rise. The case, however, is very much
changed when no impartial tribunals can be said to exist in a
foreign country, or when they have been arbitrarily controlled by
the government to the injury of our citizens. So, also, the case is
widely different when the foreign government becomes itself a
party to important contracts, and then not only fails to fulfill them,
but capriciously annuls them, to the great loss of those who have
invested their time and labor and capital from a reliance upon its
own good faith and justice. '25
In a previous communication to Mr. Lamar, Minister to Cen-
tral America, Mr. Cass stated:
"What the United States demand is, that in all cases where
their citizens have entered into contracts with the proper Nicar-
aguan authorities, and questions have arisen or shall arise respect-
'Mr. Bayard, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Hall, Minister to Central America
(Mar. 27, i888) For. Rel., 1888, Pt. I, 136. See also Moore's Dig., VI, 727.
'Idler (U. S.) v. Venezuela. (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore's A_-b., 3517.
'Mr. Cass, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Dimitry (May 3, i86o) Moore's Dig.,
VI, 287.
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ing the fidelity of their execution, no declaration of forfeiture,
either past or to come, shall possess any binding force unless pro-
nounced in conformity with the provisions of the contract, if there
are any; or if there is no provision for that purpose, then unless
there has been a fair and impartial investigation in such a manner
as to satisfy the United States that the proceeding has been just
and that the decision ought to be submitted to."
20
The forceable deprivation of the property and franchises of a
citizen of the United States without due process of law and a fair
trial is considered as a tort and the claim will be pressed on that
ground regardless of its contractual origin.
Madison, at an early date in our history, distinguished between
"compulsory measures" practiced upon United States citizens and
"voluntary contracts," the possible results of which may be pre-
sumed to have been in the contemplation of the parties .2
Perhaps the most zealous interposition on the part of the United
States has been in cases where the confiscatory act of the foreign
government consisted in the arbitrary annulment of the entire
contract or of some of its essential provisions without a resort to
the courts.
28
Numerous other cases have occurred, particularly in Venezuela,
where the arbitrary annulment of a contract by the Executive with-
out appeal to the courts was held to justify diplomatic interven-
'Mr. Cass, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Lamar, Minister to Central America(July 25, 1858) Wharton II, 66I, Moore's Dig., VI, 723-724. See also Mr.
Cass to Mr. Jerez (May 5, 1859) Moore's Dig., VI, 724. Mr. Bayard,
Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Scott, Minister to Venezuela (June 23, 1887) Moore's
Dig., VI, 725.
'Mr. Madison, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Livingston (Oct. 27, 1803)
Moore's Dig., VI, 707.
'Delagoa Bay Railroad Case, McMurdo (U. S.) v. Portugal, For. Rel.,
i9oo, 9o3; 19o2, 848-852. See also Moore's Dig., VI, 727-728, Moore's Arb.,
1865-1899.
For the El Triunfo case, Salvador Commercial Co. (U. S.) v. Salvador,
see For. Rel., 19o2, 838-88o and the learned argument of Hon. W. L. Pen-
field, Solicitor of the Department of State, 839-848. See also the legal opin-
ion (Gutachten) of Prof. Ludwig von Bar, given at the request of the
Government of Salvador, which is printed under the title "Eine interna-
tionale Rechtsstreitigkeit," in Jhering's Jahrbiicher, vol. 45, 161-210.
See also the case of May (U. S.) v. Guatemala, For. Rel., I9oo, 648-674,
Jenner Arbitrator, Moore's Dig., VI, 730. In Oliva (Italy) v. Venezuela(Feb. 13, May 7, 19o3) it was held that claimant's unlawful expulsion, pre-
venting compliance with the contract, was an arbitrary act, justifying
damages for money expended and time lost. Ralston I, 771. See also
Paquet (Belgium) v. Venezuela (March 7, 19o3) Ralston I, 269. See also
Aboilard (France) v. Hayti (June 15, 1904) Arbitrators Vignaud, Renault
and Solon Menos, Revue Gen. de Droit International Public, vol. 12 (905)
Documents, 12, 13-17.
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tion and to render the government liable.2 9  Nor has the presence
of the Calvo clause in the contract, by which the alien contractor
undertakes to make the local courts his final forum and to forego
his right to claim the diplomatic protection of his own government,
denied to the claimant's government the right to interpose in his
behalf where there has been an arbitrary annulment of the con-
tract by the local government. This conclusion has been based
on one of several grounds. In some cases the arbitrary action
of the government was held to be a tort, thus rendering the con-
struction of the contract unnecessary. In other cases the arbi-
trary action and the failure of the government to secure a judicial
construction in first instance was held to relieve the claimant from
his own stipulation to resort to the local courts and forego the
diplomatic protection of his government. In any event, it was
held that the citizen could not contract away the right of his own
government to interpose diplomatically in his behalf, the right of
his government to intervene being superior to the right or com-
petency of the individual to contract it away."
3. Various acts of foreign governments have been construed as
sufficiently arbitrary to warrant the United States in intervening in
contract claims or to authorize international commissions to award
indemnities. Thus the proposed depreciation by Hayti of the
value of certain bonds issued to American citizens for work and
materials was held to justify the United States in protesting and
eventually intervening.31  Salisbury,12 the British foreign secre-
tary, protested likewise against a proposed act of Peru tending
'Senate Document, 413, 6otb Cong., ist Sess., p. 105. Rudloff (U. S.)
v. Venezuela (Feb. 17, 19o3) Ralston I, 187. Kunhardt (U. S.) v. Venezu-
ela, Morris's Rep., Senate Document 317, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., 189-9o;
Selwyn (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 19o3) Ralston I, 322; North &
South America Construction Co. (U. S.) v. Chile (Aug. 7, 1892) Moore's
Arb., 2938 and final settlement in For. Rel., 1895, I, 85-86; Mllligan (U. S.)
v. Peru (Dec. 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 1643.
'Martini (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 1903) Ralston I, 819; Selwyn
(Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 1903) Ralston , 322; Milligan (U. S.)
v. Peru (Dec. 4, 186S) Moore's Arb., 1643; Delagoa Bay Railway case,
McMurdo (U. S. and Great Britain) v. Portugal (June r3, 1891) Moore's
Arb., 1865; see also International Law Association, 24th Rep. (19o8) ad-
dress of Jackson H. Ralston, pp. 192, 193; Mr. Bayard to Mr. Scott, Min-
ister to Venezuela (June 23, 1887) Moore's Dig., VI, 725.
'Mr. Sherman, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Powell, Minister to Hayti (Oct.
26, 1897) Moore's Dig., VI, 729.
2Marquis Salisbury, British For. Sec'y., to Seflor Pividal, Peruvian
Minister (Nov. 26, 1879) quoted from Parliamentary Papers in Moore's
Dig., VI, 724.
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to weaken certain security hypothecated to the holders of Peruvian
bonds. So the diversion of the security of certain revenue pledged
to the payment of the claims of citizens of the United States, even
when contractual in origin, has been held to warrant interposi-
tion.3
4. The United States has on several occasions intervened to
secure the payment to one of its citizens of the damages arising
through breach of contract by a foreign government where such
breach involved an element of tort. Thus the seizure by the Presi-
dent of the Dominican Republic of the Ozama bridge brought about
the diplomatic interposition of the United States in behalf of
Thurston, an American engineer who had built the bridge under
contract with that government.14  The most recent case of this
character was the arbitrary expulsion of treasurer-general Shuster
from Persia, in which case the Department of State took an
interest and by its firm position helped to secure the full payment
of salary for the entire unexpired time of the contract.35
5. The equitable character of the claim has at times induced the
Department of State to recede from its rigorous position of de-
clining interposition where the claim originated in a contract.3
6. Where an arrangement for the liquidation of the claim has
been made between the alien and the government, it will generally
be enforced by diplomatic pressure, notwithstanding its contractual
origin.3 7
.Walter (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore's Arb., 3567-3568.
Moses (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3465.
'Ozama Bridge Claim, Thurston (U. S.) v. Dominican Republic, For.
Rel., 1898, 274-291.
'Article of Clement L. Bouv6, Russia's Liability for Persia's Breach of
Contract, citing Note of Secretary of State Knox of Dec. I, igir, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 396-407.
'Letter of Evarts, Sec'y. of State, to Sir E. Thornton (May 2, 1879)
Wharton's Dig., II, 658; see also correspondence between Mr. Fish and
Mr. Thomas in 1874 in the Landreau Case v. Peru, Moore's Dig., VI, 714-
715-
'Lord John Russell, British Foreign Sec'y., to Sir C. L. Wyke (Mar.
3o, 186I), 52 St. Pap., 238, quoted also in Moore's Dig., VI, 719; Claim
of Waring Brothers, railroad contractors (Gt. Brit.) v. Brazil, in which
Great Britain insisted on the carrying out by Brazil of a decree which
appropriated an indemnity for the loss sustained by Waring Brothers due
to the government rescinding the contract. Moore's Dig., VI, 72o-72i, For.
Rel., 1887, 54, 55. The French claims against Venezuela liquidated under
the convention of July 29, 1864, Moore's Dig., VI, 711-712. See also the
settlement of the claim of W. R. Grace (U. S.) v. Peru in which the
failure of the government to carry out a judgment against it was construed
as a denial of justice warranting diplomatic intervention. Mr. Neill to
Mr. Hay, Sec'y. of State (Nov. I9, 19o3) For. Rel., i9o4, 678.
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7. Whatever hesitation there may have been on the part of the
Executive to interpose diplomatically in behalf of citizens injured
through the breach of a contract concluded with a foreign govern-
ment, the Department of State has generally been willing to sub-
mit contract claims to the adjudication of international commis-
sions, and these commissions have in general exercised jurisdic-
tion over contract claims as over other claims. 8 In instructions
given by Mr. Pickering on October 22, 1799 to the American
plenipotentiaries to France, the envoys were directed to secure the
adjustment of "all claims" of citizens of the United States against
that Government, and among these there were expressly enumer-
ated the "sums due" to American citizens by contracts with the
French Government, or its agents.3 9
By the convention between the two countries of April 30, 1803,
for the "payment of sums due" by France to citizens of the United
States, provision was made for the satisfaction of "debts." 40  In
the treaty of February 22, 1819 between the United States and
Spain by which either government renounced "all claims" of its
citizens or subjects against the other government, Mr. Adams,
Secretary of State, considered that contract claims had been in-
cluded among those renounced. 1  Mr. Adams added that there
was no doubt of the right of the government to include such claims
in the provisions of the treaty.
Practically all international commissions, where the terms of
submission in the protocol could be construed as sufficiently broad,
have exercised jurisdiction over contract claims, for example, the
United States-Spanish Commission of February 22, 1819, the three
Mexican commissions of April II, 1839, of March 3, 1849, (Do-
mestic Commission), of July 4, 1868, the United States-Brit-
ish Commission of February 8, 1853, and August 18, I9io, the
'Contract claims have been submitted to general mixed commissions
dealing with general claims (as, for example, the U. S.-Mexican commis-
sions of 1839 and 1868, the U. S.-Venezuelan commissions of 1885 and
19o3 and many others) and to special commissions instituted to decide
single claims (as, for example, the claim of Metzger & Co. (U. S.) v.
Hayti (October 18, 1899) Day, Arbitrator, For. Rel., 1901, 262--276 and that
of the San Domingo Improvement Co. (U. S.) v. Dominican Republic (Jan.
31, 1903) For. Rel., 19o4, 27o. General mixed commissions have assumedjurisdiction of contract claims under the customary inclusive terms of the
protocol "all claims," and even "claims" arising out of "injury to person or
property of citizens."
'Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., vol. 2, 242, 3oi, 3o3; see also Moore's Dig.,
VL 707-708.
"Moore's Dig., VI, 7o8.
'Moore's Dig., VI, 717-718; Moore's Arb., 4502-4505.
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United States-Peruvian Commission of January 12, 1863, the
United States-French Commission of January 15, i88o, the United
States-Venezuelan Commission of December 5, I885, the Venezue-
lan Commission of 1903 sitting at Caracas, and many others.4 2 A
conflict arose in the commission of July 4, I868, due to the difficulty
of reconciling vacillating opinions with proper judicial action. Com-
missioners Wadsworth, Palacio and Umpire Lieber (though the
latter was not always consistent) had allowed claims on contracts
concluded between citizens of the United States and agents of
Mexico for the furnishing of arms, munitions, and other material
to the Mexican Government, on the ground that the failure to pay
for such goods constituted an "injury" to the "property" of an
American citizen under the terms of the protocol. The Mexican
Commissioner, Palacio, while adhering to the view of his colleagues
that contract claims were within the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion believed that a demand and refusal of payment was a condi-
tion precedent to the allowance of the claim. Subsequently upon
the death of Dr. Lieber and the resignation of Commissioner Pal-
acio, Sir Edward Thornton became umpire and Sefior Zamacona
the Mexican Commissioner. Thereupon a different view was taken
as to the jurisdiction of the commission over contract claims. Sir
Edward Thornton considered that he ought to follow the practice
of the Executive of exercising discretion in assuming jurisdic-
tion of contract claims, for which reason, while admitting the
jurisdiction of the commission over contract claims, he declined
to allow such as were based upon voluntary contract, in the ab-
sence of clear proof of the contract and that gross injustice had
been done by the defendant government. The decisions of the
42See Moore's Dig., VI, 718; Ralston I, Report of Venezuelan Com-
missions; Moore's Arb., 3425-3590; J. Hubley Ashton, Agent of the
United States before the Mixed Commission with Mexico of July 4. i858,
in an elaborate argument in the case of the State Bank of Hartford (No.
535) and other similar cases, opposing a motion to dismiss for want of juris-
diction over contract claims, analyzed minutely the practice of the United
States and the jurisdiction of international commissions in the matter
of contract claims, especially under a protocol submitting "all claims...
arising out of injuries to . . . person or property." He cited decisions of
municipal courts and international tribunals to show that under the
terms "all claims" and "injuries," breaches of contract were included.
Among others he cited decisions of the commissions under the treaty with
Spain, I819, (8 Stat. L. 258), with Great Britain, 1853, (io Stat. L. 988),
with New Granada, 1857, (12 Stat. L. 985), with Costa Rica, i86o. (12
Stat. . II39), with Colombia, 1864, (3 Stat. L. 685), with Ecuador, 1862,(i3 Stat. L. 633), with Peru, 1853, (I3 Stat. L. 639), with Venezuela, I866,
(i6 Stat. L. 316) and with Peru, i868, (i6 Stat. L. 349). He also men-
tioned the three Mexican Commissions. The argument is on file in the
Department of State Library.
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commission, therefore, are at times contradictory, claims of exactly
the same nature being allowed by Wadsworth, Palacio and Lieber,
and being rejected when Zamacona became the Mexican Com-
missioner and Thornton the umpire.43
There have been occasions when international commissions
would not exercise jurisdiction over contract claims. 44 It was
agreed by the United States and Spain in the claims convention
of February 12, 1871, that the arbitrators were not to have juris-
diction of claims growing out of contract.
45
Where jurisdiction is exercised by mixed commissions, as is
the general rule, the contract will be examined as would any other
instrument open to judicial construction.46  Among other factors
the authority of the person contracting as agent for the govern-
ment is always closely examined. The general rules of agency
are applied.47
"A full discussion of this perplexing question before the commission was
undertaken by Mr. Commissioner Wadsworth in the case of Treadwell &
Co., (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, i868) quoted at length in Opinions of the
commission, vol. 4, 248, and vol. 7, 383. The claims were allowed in the
cases of Manasse, Moore's Arb., 3462-3464; Iturria, Moore's Arb., 3464;
Moses, Assignee, Moore's Arb., 3465; Newton, Moore's Arb., 3465; Mor-
rill, Moore's Arb., 3465; and were disallowed by Thornton, umpire, in cases
of supplies furnished, services rendered, and other claims based on vol-
untary contract, in the Phipps' case, Moore's Arb., 3468; Treadwell,
Moore's Arb.,3468; Pond, Moore's Arb., 3467; Nolan, Moore's Arb.,
3484; Light, Moore's Abr., 3484; Wallace, Moore's Arb., 3475; Kennedy
& King, Moore's Arb., 3474; State Bank of Hartford, Moore's Arb..
3473; Shumaker, Moore's Arb., 3472; Chase, Moore's Arb., 3469; Kearney,
Moore's Arb., 3468; Sturm, (dictum) Moore's Arb., 2756; Dennison,
Moore's Arb., 2766; De Witt, Moore's Arb., 3466; Widman, Moore's Arb.,
3467. Lieber's decision in disallowing the claim of Thore de Lespes for
the hire of a steam tug to Mexico (Moore's Arb., 3466) is inconsistent
with his other opinions.
"U. S.-British Mixed Commission of May 7, 1871. See Hubbell (U. S.)
V. Great Britain, Moore's Arb., 3484-6; Hale's Rep., 4o; Howard's Rep.,
16o, 752, 754.
"Agreement of Feb. 11-12, 1871, art. 15, Moore's Arb., 4802-4803.
"Turnbull, Manoa, Limited, Orinoco, et al (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb.
17, 1903) Ralston I, 244, where Barge held a certain contract void ab
initio. See also American Electric and Manufacturing Co. (U. S.) -Z.
Venezuela (Feb. 17, 19o3) Ralston I, 25o, where Barge held a promise to
declare void an existing contract as an illegal promise. See also Frear
(U. S.) v. France (Jan. 15, 188o) Moore's Arb., 3488-3491, Boutwell's
Rep., 2o2, where it was found that the claimant had not performed the
contract on his part.
Lew Wallace (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3475-
3476, in which case the Mexican agent had acted beyond the scope of his
authority, for which reason the contract was held not binding on Mexico.
See also Beales Nobles & Garrison case (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5,
1885) Moore's Arb., 3548-3564- In Zander (U. S.) v. Mexico (March 3,
1849) Moore's Arb., 3433, the failure to show the original authority of the
agent or the subsequent ratification of his acts by the government barred
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A contract for unneutral service will as a general rule not be
enforced either by municipal 8 or international4 9 courts. There
have been a few occasions where international commissions on the
ground of equity or waiver of the illegality have made awards on
unneutral contracts. This is especially so where the political party
aided was successful or became at least a de facto government."0
The domestic commission under the act of March 3, 1849
held that while the United States was not justified in press-
ing a claim growing out of services in violation of the claimant's
neutrality as a citizen of a neutral nation, yet, if Mexico, the
nation against whom such claim existed, sees proper to waive the
objection and agrees to recognize the claim, the tribunal can not
assume for it a defense expressly waived.r1
Speculative contracts are not enforced.52  The service itself
where of an extraordinary character, such as the giving of advice
in battle, has been held not measurable in money damages, but call-
ing rather for a monument or some other mark of national grati-
tude.1 While we have seen that as a general rule a claim for
voluntary services is not pressed by the Department of State, in-
the claim. 'In Trumbull (Chile) v'. United States (Aug. 7, 1892) an award
was made on the ground that claimant had a right to assume that the
United States minister in engaging his legal services was authorized so
to do.
'
3Kennett et al. v. Chambers, 14 How. 38; Du Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9
Moore's C. B. Rep., 586; see also Kent's Commentaries, I, 116.
4 Cucullu (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Aib., 3478-3479;
Fitch (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3476-3477; Wallace(U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3475-3476.
'Lake (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 2755, Opinion by
Palacio, Commissioner; Chew (U. S.) v. Mexico (April I1, 1839) Moore's
Arb., 3428 and other cases there cited; Hunter, Duncan et al (U. S.) v.
Mexico (April 11, 1839) Moore's Arb., 3427; Cucullu (U. S.) v. Mexico
(July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3478-3479; claims of Stephen Codman, No.
86, and John & Robert Gamble, No. 1783, were allowed by the mixed com-
mission under the treaty with Spain of 1819, cited in Ashton's argument,
supra.
"Meade (U. S.) v. Mexico (Act of Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 343o,
3432. Other commissions have held that only the nation whose laws have
been violated can waive the illegality and not the state aided by the un-
neutral act.
a-Taussig (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3472-3473,
where the nonfulfillment of a contract for the sale of vessels, etc. to a
government, said vessels having been purchased as a speculation on their
subsequent sale, was held not to be an injury to person or property within
the meaning of the protocol. See also Oliva (Italy) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13,
19o3) Ralston I, 780.
'O'Dwyer (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore's Arb., 3568.
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ternational commissions, with the exception of the United States-
Mexican Commission of 1868 after Thornton became Umpire,
have not hesitated to allow damages for services thus rendered.
They have occasionally held; however, that a demand for payment
must be made upon the debtor government.54  Where the debt
has been acknowledged there is usually no hesitation either on the
part of the government, or of international commissions respec-
tively to demand and to allow damages on claims arising out of
contract.5 5 Such acknowledgment' has even been held to purge
the contract of illegality, as, for example, the unneutral character
of the act.
MCucullu (U. S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3483. Palacio
in a dictum said that under the word "injury" a mere omission of pay-
ment of a debt makes it necessary to bring it to the knowledge of the
defendant government. Throughout the commission Palacio held that
notice and a refusal of payment were conditions precedent to a valid claim.
Union Land Company et al (U. S.) v. Mexico (Act of Congress, Mar. 3,
1849) Moore's Arb., 3440, service rendered in securing immigrants. Meade
(U. S.) v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 3431, expenses incurred in
fitting out vessel in service of Mexico. The "Hermon," Green (U. S.)
v. Mexico (April i1, 1839) Moore's Arb., 3425. repairs and ship stores
furnished to a vessel of war. Boulton et al (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb.
17, 1903) Ralston I, 25-29, carrying the mails. Turini (U. S.) v. Venezuela
(Feb. 17, 1903) Ralston I, 51-52, services rendered as a sculptor. The
Great Venezuelan Railroad (Germany) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 1903) Ral-
ston I, 638, railroad forcibly used to carry troops. Hudson Bay Co. (Gt.
Brit.) v. U. S. (Feb. 8, 1853) Moore's Arb., 3459, goods supplied to ship-
wrecked sailors and other citizens of the United States to secure their
relief from captivity by savage Indians and in repelling attacks, which
service the government should have rendered. Bldredge (U. S.) v. Peru
(Jan. r2, 1863) Moore's Arb., 3462, supplies furnished to Peruvian army.
Dundonald (Gt. Brit.) v. Brazil (October, 1873) Moore's Arb., 2I07-2I08,
military service rendered by Admiral Lord Cochrane. Underhill (U. S.)
v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 3433, charter of a vessel. Ulrick(U. S.) v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 3434, lease of house for
legation.
On the services rendered to Mexico by American citizens see a pam-
phlet, "The Republic of Mexico and its American creditors. The unful-
filled obligations of the Mexican Republic to citizens of the U. S. from
whom it obtained material aid on credit." (Indianapolis, Douglass &
Conner, 1869, 94 P.)
Sparrow (U. 5.) v. Peru, For. Rel., 18g5, Pt. II, lO36-1o55; settled in
5896, For. Rel., 1896, 492-494- Lord 3. Russell to Sir C. K. Wyke (Mar. 30,
1861) in the case of British bondholders whose unpaid bonds were con-
verted into a liquidated debt against Mexico, St. Pap., vol. 52, 238-239.
Cox & Slkins (U. S.) v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 5849) Moore's Arb., 3430. Par-
rott (U. S.) v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 3430. Eckford (U. S.)
v. Mexico, (March 3, 1849) Op. 435 (not in Moore) ; Mercantile Insurance
Co. (U. S.) V. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., . Meyer (U. S.)
v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 238o. Rosenwig, Crosby et al
(U. S.) v. Peru (Dec. 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 1651-1652. Hammaken (U.S.)
v. Mexico (Mar. 3, 1849) Moore's Arb., 3471. Corcuera (Spain) v. Ven-
ezuela (Feb. 13, 19o3) Ralston I, 936.
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Bonds of Public Debt.
We come now to the third class of contract claims, those arising
out of the unpaid bonds of a foreign government, held by a citizen.
These obligations of the State differ in many respects from the
contractual obligations arising out of a contract for concessions or
the execution of public works. In the latter case, the government
has entered into relations with a definite person; in the former,
bonds usually being payable to bearer and negotiable by mere de-
livery, the State never knows prior to presentation for payment to
whom it is indebted.
Some publicists regard such a bond as a contractual obligation
subject to the same rules, both in interpretation and enforcement,
as ordinary contract debts. 56 Hall even goes so far as to assimilate
in principle a breach of a monetary agreement, e. g., the non-pay-
ment of public loans, to tortious injuries committed by the gov-
ernment, though he admits a difference in practice in enforcing
the two classes of claims.57 The unpaid bond of a foreign govern-
ment held by a citizen has been a frequent and most perplexing
cause of international conflict.
Before discussing the nature of the enforcement of rights aris-
ing out of public debts, let us examine the nature of the contract
and the law governing the transaction of subscribing to the public
loan of a foreign state. If the lending citizen is domiciled in the
country emitting the loan we may for many purposes regard the
contract as subject to the law of the debtor country. When, how-
ever, as is generally the case in external loans, the lending citizen
or subsequent transferee-holder is domiciled not in the debtor
country, but in his own or some other state, we meet difficult ques-
tions in the conflict of laws and in international law. Is the trans-
action one of private or public law, and if private, what law gov-
erns its interpretation?
In the first place we may admit that a contract has been con-
cluded. If it is a contract of private law concluded by the state
in its capacity as an ordinary contractor (jure gentionis)," there
'Vattel, Law of Nations, Bk. II, Ch. XIV, .. 214-216; Phillimore, Inter-
national Law (3rd ed.) vol. II, Ch. III, 8 et seq. See opinion of Findlay.
commissioner, in case of Aspinwall before U. S.-Venezuelan commission
of 1885, Moore's Arb., 3650.
"
7Hall, International Law (6th ed.) 276.
'We cannot here discuss the distinctions between contracts made by a
government in its capacity as a business corporation and engagements
contracted in its character as a sovereign. We may merely note the usual
rule of the suability of the government on contracts of the former cate-
gory, and its immunity in the case of contracts of the latter description.
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would be some ground for asserting that the contract is subject to
the local law of the debtor state,5" or as the contract is often to
be performed in the country of the lending citizen, where the in-
terest and principal are sometimes to be paid, that the law of the
place of performance governs. Again, the loan may be subscribed
in a third state, as, for example, where a Chinese loan is under-
written by a New York banker, the individual bonds being held
by citizens of Germany; the loan having been made in a third
state, the lex loci might be regarded as the law governing the con-
tract. Other possibilities have been suggested, as, for example,
where the loan has been guaranteed, that the law of the guarantee-
ing state governs, 60 or that the parties themselves may agree on
the law governing the contract.6 '
If the contract were concluded between individuals or between
a municipal corporation and an individual, the above theories
might warrant consideration. The factor which makes the public
loan a contract sui generis is that one of the contracting parties
is a sovereign and therefore not subject to the ordinary rules of
legal obligation, and the other a non-resident alien, against whom
the local territorial law is not enforceable.6 The debt is generally
authorized and created by an act of legislation, which escapes all
judicial review. The inherent reservation of the possibility of
modifying the terms of the loan, suspending or even repudiating
it by an act of sovereignty similar to that which created it, has
led some writers to the conclusion that the obligation of the state
is one of honor only, a moral, and not a legal obligation,6' so far
'Freund, G. S. Die Rechtsverhailtnisse der 6ffentlichen Anleihen (Ber-
lin, 1907) 64 et seq. This is probably the most thoughtful book on the
subject of public loans.
Loening, Edgar. Die Gerichtsbarkeit fiber fremde Staaten und Sou-
verfine (Halle, I903) 256 and authorities there cited. See also Freund, G.
S. Der Schutz der Gliubiger gegen fiber auswirtigen Schuldnerstaaten
(Berlin, igio) 14.
Pflug, Karl. Staatsbankerott und internationales Recht (Miinchen,
1898) I5-i6. Cuvelie'r in Rev. de droit international (1888) ii.
'Wuarin, Albert. Essai sur les emprunts d'6tats (Paris, 1907) 88
et seq.
Imbert, Henri M. Les emprunts d'6tats 6trangers (Paris, 1905) 50
et seq., 96.
6
'Meili, Fr. Das internationale Zivil- und Handelsrecht, II, 57. Clerin,
Georges. Inexcution par un 6tat de ses engagements financiers ext6rieurs
(Dijon, 19o8).
"'Freund, Der Schutz der Gldubiger, etc., 15; Wuarin, op. cit. 34.
'Bar, Ludwig von. The theory and pratice of private international
law (2nd ed. trans. by G. R. Gillespie; Edinburgh, 1892) 1152, and certain
French cases there cited.
Politis, Nicolas E. Les emprunts d'6tat en droit international (Paris,
1894) 280. Milanowitsch, cited by Freund, Rechtsverhdltnisse, etc., 56.
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at least as its enforcement in municipal courts is concerned.
Freund tells us that several German writers regard it as discre-
tonary with the state whether it will take up foreign loans. 64 Zorn
even regards the payment of interest as the exercise of a sovereign
right.65 The failure of a state therefore to take up a public loan,
not being justiciable in municipal courts, has been regarded as not
legally a breach of a contractual obligation. This confuses the
nature of the contract with the means of its enforcement.
The foreign citizen would never lend his money on such un-
certain security. He does in no sense regard himself as subject
to the local law of the debtor state, as he has never entered its
territorial jurisdiction. His rights as lender and the obligations
of the debtor are derived from the contract of loan which neither
the creditor nor his government regard as purely one of private
law to be interpreted by the local courts of the debtor state.
The mixed private and public nature of the transaction of sub-
scribing to a foreign loan shows that it partakes of the nature of
an international contract, and that its breach, if not justiciable
before municipal courts, does give rise, under certain circum-
stances, to the diplomatic interposition of the national government
of the creditor, and in practice has at times resulted in armed in-
tervention. These questions we shall discuss hereafter.
The transaction of subscription to a foreign public loan is not
purely an international contract, for this could be concluded only
by states and not by a state and the subjects of another state. The
contract is, however, by its nature under the protection of inter-
national law and is what Bluntschli called a quasi-international con-
tract.66 There is certainly some analogy between a contract (I)
between Venezuela and Germany and (2) between Venezuela and
a German citizen for the building of a vessel, or the borrowing
of money. Neither contracting party in these cases would be will-
ing to submit to the national municipal law of the other.
"Freund, Schutz der Gldubiger, 13.
'Zorn in Bankarchiv VI, io6, cited by Freund, Schutz der Gldubiger, 13.
'Bluntschli, Das moderne V61kerrecht der civilisirten Staaten (N6rd-
lingen, 1878, 3rd ed.) §§ 442, 433 (b).
Pflug, op. cit., 40-41.
The argument against the international nature of the contract of public
loan, that individuals can not derive rights from international agreements
as they are not subjects of international law, has been greatly weakened by
the Hague Convention for the establishment of an international prize court
and the growing opinion, shared by authorities like Westlake and Bonfils,
that individuals may derive subjective rights from international agreements.
See also art. 2 of the Convention establishing the Central American Court
of Justice.
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If we turn to the jurisdiction of courts and the means of en-
forcement of the contract, the international nature of the legal
relation created will become apparent. While in theory the juris-
diction of the courts of the debtor state may be invoked, several
contingencies in connection with the public loan must always be
borne in mind. First, the debtor state may or may not permit it-
self to be sued.67 While most states now freely subject them-
selves to suit in cases of ordinary contracts, many states still de-
cline to extend this right so far as the public debt is concerned.
Many states of the United States have repudiated their debts and
have declined to permit themselves to be sued on them.6 8 Again,
as the public loan is created by legislation, an act of sovereignty,
so it may be suspended, reduced or even repudiated by a similar
act of sovereignty, by which the national courts are bound. The
creditor, therefore, is juridically opposed to a sovereign who may
with perfect legality, by an act of sovereignty, deprive him of his
substantive right and of his remedy. In other words, the State
in the exercise of its sovereign powers, may regulate the exe-
cution of its contract of loan in any manner conformable with its
public interest.69 Again, the improbability in many states of se-
curing an impartial judicial determination by national courts in
cases of this kind makes the creditor's position precarious. To
sue the debtor state on a public loan, therefore, is practically use-
less. There are some states whose national courts might grant a
creditor relief. These are the states that are never sued for their
national debts.
To sue the debtor state before the courts of the creditor is still
less practicable. As a general rule municipal courts decline to
'Twycross v. Dreyfus, 36 Law Times Rep. [N. S.] (July 21, 1877) 752,
755. See also, Moulin, Le Doctrine de Drago (Paris, i9o8) 86 et seq.
"Scott, William A. The repudiation of state debts (New York,
1893), particularly Chap. I, in which the constitutional and legal aspects,
with the decisions of the Supreme Court and state courts are lucidly pre-
sented.
'Lewandowski, Maurice. De ]a protection des capitaux emprunt6s en
France par les Etats 6trangers (Paris, 1896) 24 et seq. While apparently
accepted as a principle, the theory is by no means undisputed that a state
contracts a public loan in its character as a sovereign, jure imperii, and is
not bound contractually to its creditors. See Moulin, H. A. La Doctrine
de Drago (Paris, 198o) 76 et seq. Freund, Rechtsverhiltnisse, etc., 59-61.
Speech of M. Ruy Barbosa (July 23, I9o7) at the Hague Conference of
I9O7, Actes et Discours de M. Ruy Barbosa, 6o et seq. See also the recent
case of De Andrade v. the government of Brazil, reported in Clunet (1913)
vol. 40, 237.
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take jurisdiction over foreign states as defendants. 70  The excep-
tion of voluntary submission and questions concerning real estate
are hardly of practical significance for the present case.
The French courts take the firm position that bondholders of
the debt of a foreign state can not sue before the French courts.71
The English courts have usually declined to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign states, and in the case of bondholders of foreign debts
have unequivocably declared themselves jurisdictionally incompe-
tent.72 This is the rule of the German, and Austrian courts73 and
has been the uniform rule in courts of the United States.74  In
Belgium and Italy the courts seem to have adopted the distinction
of administrative law between transactions of the state under-
taken jure imperii and jure gentionis, and to have exercised juris-
diction in the latter case.75
If there were still any doubt as to the impracticability of relief
by suit against a foreign government in municipal courts, it would
be dispelled by the certainty that execution of the judgment, even
7Bynkershoek is the father of this theory.
Loening, E. Die Gerichtsbarkeit fiber fremde Staaten u Souverine(Halle, 1903) is one of the leading works on the subject. The opinions
of courts are discussed p. 23 et seq.; the opinions of writers, p. 55
et seq. See also Brie, Fischer & Fleischmann, Zwangsvollstreckung gegen
fremde Staaten u Kompetenzkonflikt (Breslau, 191o) containing three
opinions rendered at the request of Russia in the case of Helfeld v.
Russia on the question of the jurisdiction of German courts over funds
of Russia in Germany and the possibility of execution against them. The
translation of the decision of the German court for the determination ofjurisdictional conflicts in the now famous Hellfeld case may be found in
5 Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (1911) 490-519.
See on the whole subject an able article by Droop in Gruchot's Beitrige
zur Erlduterung des deutschen Rechts, vol. 26, 289-316, in which the de-
cisions of courts are carefully reviewed. Some writers have made a dis-
tinction as to jurisdiction over foreign states, depending upon whether the
transaction in question involved the defendant state in its capacity as a
sovereign (jure imperii) or as a fiscus (jure gentionis), granting immunity
from jurisdiction in the former case, but asserting it in the latter. The
most noteworthy of these writers are Laurent, Droit civil international
(Paris, 188o) vol. 3, 42-103 and von Bar, op. cit., iioi et seq. They have
been followed by a number of courts, notably those of Belgium and Italy.
"See the cases cited in Weiss, A. Trait6 de droit international priv6,
vol. 5, 94; Loening, op. cit., 45.
'
2Westlake, J. A treatise on private international law (London,
1905, 4th ed.) §§ I9O, 192 and cases there cited. See particularly Twy-
cross v. Dreyfus, (877) 36 Law Times Rep. [N. S.] 755, 757, decision
of Jessel, M. R.
"Citations of cases in Brie, op. cit., and Loening, op. cit., 23 et seq.
7 Moore, J. B. in his American notes to Dicey, A. V. A digest of the
laws of England with reference to the conflict of laws (London, 1896)
p. 229. See leading case of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812) 7
Cranch 116. 30 Cyc. 1O4 and cases there cited.
"Cases cited in Loening, op. cit., 52-54.
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if obtainable, is practically impossible. No legal process lies
against the property of a foreign state, and even the jurisdictional
distinction made by some courts between acts jure imperii and jure
gentionis is disregarded in the matter of execution. The exception
of actions involving real estate does not concern us here. Even
attachment and garnishment proceedings against the movable prop-
erty of foreign sovereigns are almost uniformly dismissed.-,
It is thus apparent that national municipal courts, either of the
debtor state or of the country of the creditor, are unable to secure
the unpaid creditor any remedy. He is not left helpless, however.
The sanction for a violation of his rights is found in international
law and practice, in that states have frequently interfered in
behalf of their creditor subjects to secure the payment of unful-
filled national obligations of foreign states. Before examining the
legitimacy of diplomatic interposition and intervention for such
unpaid creditors, let us inquire into the nature of the transaction
by which a citizen becomes a holder of a share in the public debt
of a foreign nation.
We have already seen that the emission of a public loan takes
place by legislative act. The individual abroad may take up the
bond either through a direct transaction with the government, or
through a banker who has underwritten the loan. As a general
rule, however, the bonds are purchased in the open market as in-
dustrial securities would be, without any direct relation with the
debtor government. Being payable to bearer, they pass from hand
to hand, from national to national, by mere delivery.
Again, the price paid. takes into account the value of the se-
curity, both intrinsically and as an investment. Thus the solva-
bility of the government bears a direct relation to the price of its
bond. Weak and unstable governments must sell below par and
pay high rates of interest. The original capitalist takes advantage
of the necessities of the borrowing state and exacts discounts and
interest accordingly, and subsequent dealers in the bond know
the conditions equally well. The legal fact that the emission was
an act of sovereignty, that the debt may be repudiated or reduced
by a similar act, that the usual civil remedies are barred, and that
the State is the sole judge of its ability to pay, are known to all
"'Brie, op. cit., 45 et seq. Loening, op. cit., 139 et seq. The cases of von
Hellfeld v. Russia, supra, Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada (igos)
197 Mass. 349. See article by Nathan Wolfman "Sovereigns as Defendants"
in 4 Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (191o) 373-383, in which a departure
from the general rule is urged in favor of jurisdiction over property en-
gaged in private or commercial undertakings.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW.
parties to the transaction. The investor therefore buys with full
notice and assumption of the risks, and has weighed the proba-
bilities of large profits against the danger of loss.
It is for these reasons that it seems unfair, both to the debtor
state and to the fellow nationals of the creditors (who may in-
deed change from day to day), that the government of the creditor
should make the breach of such a contractual obligation to a citi-
zen who accidentally holds a foreign public bond a cause for armed
international action involving the whole nation in the burden, and
making the government in effect the underwriter and guarantor of
his investment in the securities of a foreign government.
This is the principal argument of the Drago Doctrine, first ad-
vanced in the celebrated note of December 29, i9o2 from Dr.
Luis Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentine, to the Ar-
gentine Minister at Washington, and by him submitted to the De-
partment of State, on the occasion of the joint intervention of
Great Britain, Italy and Germany against Venezuela. The argu-
ment led up to the recommendation of proposed policy, intended to
be a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, that "the public debt [of
an American state] can not occasion armed intervention, nor even
the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a
European power.
' 77
We may note that Drago protests only against the use of armed
force in the collection of public debts and not directly against dip-
lomatic interposition. Most of the writers who have discussed the
question have failed to note this distinction, possibly because a
denial of forcible measures deprives interposition of its most
'The text of the Drago note will be found in Foreign Relations 1903,
i-5. Dr. Drago has written the following monographs on the doctrine which
has been named after him. Cobro coercitivo de deudas publicas (Buenos
Ayres, i9o6) ; Les emprunts d'Etat et leurs rapports avec la politique inter-
nationale, Revue G~nrale de droit international public, vol. 14, 251,
translated practically in full in his article "State loans in their relation to
international policy," in i Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (907) 692-726. Among
the best literature in English are two thoughtful articles by George Win-
field Scott "International law and the Drago doctrine" in North American
Review, Oct., i9o6, o2-6bo, and "Hague convention restricting the use of
force to recover contract claims," in 2 Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (i9o8)
78-94; an article by Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago doctrines, in i
Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (9o7) 26-45; and Chapter VIII, vol. i, (pp. 386-
422) of James Brown Scott's The Hague Peace conferences of i8gg and
1907 (Baltimore, igog). One of the best books is Moulin's La doctrine
de Drago (Paris, i9o8), and a useful collection of documents is to be
found in S. Perez Triana, La doctrina Drago (Londres, i9o8). Further
references to foreign literature may be found in Bonfils, Manuel (6th ed.,
1912) I86, n. 4. See also a recent work by Vivot, A. N. La doctrina Drago.
Buenos Aires, igii.
CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
effective sanction. They therefore consider the protest against
the sanction as directed against the whole remedy, though even
without the potential use of force it still has some room for ap-
plication. In expressly stating that he did not intend to make his
"doctrine" a defense "for bad faith, disorder and deliberate and
voluntary insolvency," Dr. Drago has, we believe, set the proper
bounds to his principle, although, as we shall point out, the creditor
state is still (except as restrained by the Porter proposifion) left
the sole judge of the existence of these limiting conditions.
Before proceeding further, we may discuss briefly the opinions
of publicists and the practice of nations in the matter of interven-
tion to 'collect public debts, by which we mean diplomatic inter-
position followed by force. Westlake as we have seen (supra
P. 459) has properly recognized the distinction in substance and in
remedial process between contracts made with the State in its
character as a fiscus or business administrator and those arising
out of subscription to or transfer of a public bond. He regards
honest inability to pay as a title to consideration, and unless the
defaulting government presumes to treat its internal and external
debts on terms of inequality unfavorable to the latter, he thinks
"the assistance of their state ought not to be granted to the bond-
holders of public loans."
Some of the earlier writers, prominent among them Grotius
and Vattel, admitted the legitimacy of reprisals against a state
or sovereign who refused to pay a lawful debt (supra p. 461).
Inability and refusal to pay are not however identical. Phillimore
and Hall, supporting the views of the British government, con-
tend that a debt contracted by a foreign government toward a
citizen constitutes an obligation of which the country of the lender
has a right to require and enforce the fulfillment.78 Yet Philli-
more approves, as he says, "the proposition of Martens
that the foreigner can only claim to be put on the same footing as
the native creditor of the State. 79  Rivier, one of the foremost
authorities, has in this respect asserted a far-reaching right of
intervention under circumstances far more unreasonable than those
admitted by other publicists. Unless we may assume that the
words underlined (underlining ours) presuppose fraud and bad
faith, his doctrine will hardly find general support, though it must
'Phillimore, Int. Law (3rd ed.) vol. 2, Ch. III, 8 et seq.; Hall, Int.
Law (6th ed.) 275-76.
'Phillimore, Op. cit., vol. 2, 14.
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be admitted that the weaker states have at times found themselves
intervened against under circumstances no harsher than those men-
tioned by Rivier:
"The fortune of individuals, subjects of the state, forms an
element of the riches and prosperity of the State itself. It has an
interest in the maintenance and increase of that fortune. If it
is compromised by the act of a foreign state which administers
its finances badly, which betrays the confidence individuals placed
in it when they subscribed to loans on conditions that are not ob-
served, and which violates its engagements in regard to them,
the state to which the injured individuals belong is evidently au-
thorized to take their interests in hand in any manner which it
shall deem suitable; it may proceed either by diplomacy or by re-
prisals . . . Individuals have not, as a general rule, the right
to require of the State that it shall thus take their cause in hand.
The State may refuse to act in their favor for reasons of which
it is the sole judge; but if it acts, it only exercises its right. It
may see to it, perchance, according to the circumstances, that its
subjects are better treated than those of other states, or than those
of the insolvent state. This is, from the legal point of view, a
matter of absolute indifference." ' ,
G. F. de Martens sanctions intervention in case of "violent
financial operations" of the debtor state depriving creditors of
their loans, but he adds that creditors can not demand better treat-
ment than nationals. Although cited by Phillimore as an advocate
of intervention, opponents may also find support in his ambiguous
doctrines. 8'
The majority of writers consider armed intervention for the
mere non-payment of public debts an unjustifiable procedure, their
reasons being similar to those advanced by Dr. Drago, to wit:
that hazardous loans should be discouraged; that those making
them have full notice of the risks; that foreigners can not expect
to be preferred to native creditors; that force is never resorted
to except against weak states and is often a pretext for aggression
or conquest; and, finally, that the loss of credit and standing in-
curred by the State is an ample and effective penalty for the
failure to fulfill its obligations.8 2 The objections of writers, how-
s"Rivier, Alphonse. Principles du droit des gens (Paris, i896) vol. i,
272.
"G. F. de Martens, Precis du droit des gens (Paris, 1864) vol. I, 298,
§ Iio. See also Phillimore, op. cit., 14, and Pradier-Fod6r6, Trait6, vol. I,
§ 4o5, p. 623, note.
8'These authorities are enumerated and citations to their works given in
the second part of footnote 34 of Hershey's article in i Amer. Journ. of Int.
Law (1907) 37; in the work of Wuarin, op. cit., 155-159; and in the address
of Gen. Horace Porter before the Second Hague Conference on July 16,
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ever, are directed not to diplomatic interposition, but rather to
an excess of interposition in the use of armed force to collect un-
paid public loans.
The preponderance of opinion is, however, that under certain
circumstances intervention to secure the payment of public loans
is legitimate. Authorities differ merely as to the nature of the
circumstances. In general we may say that intervention is not
warranted in the case of an honest inability of the State to pay
its debts, but only when, the means being at hand, the debtor state
wilfully refuses to pay; or further, when foreign creditors are il-
legally treated, especially if they are discriminated against in favor
of national creditors, or if certain categories of creditors are pre-
ferred to others; or when special funds assigned as security to the
payment of certain debts are diverted or suppressed ;--in short,
when bad faith may be considered the moving cause of the non-
payment. In the present condition of international law, in which
states, large and small, have no common superior to control or
check them, each. state has the legal right of deciding for itself
whether the conditions warranting intervention exist. In the use
of this right, the power of enforcing its demands has often been a
factor more controlling than the mere legitimacy or fairness of
its action.83
i9o7 in presenting the American proposition for the limitation of force
in the collection of contractual debts' La deuxieme Conference interna-
tionale de la Paix, vol. II, 229-233. Also printed in English (Hague,
i9o7). The principal publicists who oppose what we may call finan-
cial intervention are F. de Martens, Westlake, Holland, Bonfils, Calvo,
Pradier-Fod6r6, Rolin-Jacquemyns, Despagnet, von Bar, Liszt, Geffcken.
Kebedgy, Nys, Merignhac, F6raud-Giraud, Weiss, Olivecrona. and Floecker.
Gen. Porter also cited Rivier. but this must have been an oversight. See
also Collas, Der Staatsbankerott und seine Abwicklung (Stuttgart, 1904)
51 and Freund, Rechtsverhfiltnisse, etc., 271.
'The decision of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Preferential Claims case of Germany, Great Britain and Italy against
Venezuela has been considered an approval of the use of force in the
collection of claims based on contract or public debt. While it is true
that the use of force appears to have been sanctioned by the tribunal by
the allowance of preferential treatment of the three blockading powers, it
is certain that only a small part of the claims pressed arose out of con-
tractual debts. The primary reason of the blockade was the stubborn
reiteration by Venezuela of the exclusive jurisdiction of its national
courts and the absolute refusal to arbitrate. Castro's arrogance ex-
hausted the patience and temper of the powers. See article by Basdevant,
Jules. L'action coercitive Anglo-Germano-Italienne contre le Venezuela
(i9o2-i9o3) Revue g~n6rale de droit int. pub. vol. 1i, 363-45& Hershey,
Amos S. The Venezuelan affair in the light of international law, American
Law Register, vol. 5i, 249-267. The Hague decision is criticised by Andr6
Mallarm6 in an article L'arbitrage v6nezueien in Revue generale, vol. 13,
423-5oo. For the corespondence .see Asuntos Internacionales, two volumes
of the Yellow Book of Venezuela published in i9o3 and extracts printed
in the Appendix to Ralston's Report of the Venezuelan Arbitrations.
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There is, in fact, no definite rule as to diplomatic intervention
in the matter of unpaid public loans, except in so far as the con-
vention of the Second Hague Conference for the limitation of the
use of force in the collection of contractual debts will operate as a
check by requiring under certain conditions a preliminary resort
to arbitration.
The European powers have on several occasions intervened to
secure the payment of public loans due their subjects. Their ac-
tion has taken various forms. Sometimes it has been merely the
use of good offices and an approval of arrangements for financial
control made by national bankers or associations of bondholders
with the debtor state, as in the case of Turkey (I88I) and Servia
(19o4) ; an assumption of limited national control, as in the case
of the United States in the Dominican Republic (19o7) ; or joint
intervention of several powers taking financial control as in the
case of Tunis (I868), of Greece s4 (1897) and Egypt (188o).85 This
is intervention in the true sense, in that it involves an administra-
tive control over a certain portion of national resources and rev-
enues. It seems to be more proper on the part of a state or states
guaranteeing the debt of some weak state placed under their
guardianship. Both this form of action and the collection of loans
by force of arms without complete intervention, as the joint oper-
ations against Mexico in 1861 and against Venezuela in 19o2, have
invariably been carried out against weak states. When Spain,
Italy, Austria and Hungary at different times suspended or re-
duced their public obligations there was no intervention on the part
of the powers whose subjects had shares in the unpaid or under-
paid loans. This is at least cumulative evidence in establishing
that intervention or the use of arms to collect public loans is a
question of power and politics rather than a rule of law.
Notwithstanding Great Britain's participation in the operations
against Mexico in 1861, against Egypt in i88o and against Vene-
"Kebedgy, Michel S. Les difficult~s financi~res de la Grace et l'inter-
vention des 6tats 6trangers. Revue g~nrale, vol. I, 261-271. Imbert,
Henri Marc. Les emprunts d'6tats 6trangers (Paris, 1905) gives an ac-
count of the various cases of intervention in Turkey, Egypt, Portugal,
Greece, Tunis (pp. 6o-99). Kebedgy, M. S. De la protection des cr~anciers
d'un Etat 6tranger, Clunet, vol. 21, 59-72, 504-519. See also Wuarin,
Freund and Politis, op. cit. Meili, Fr. Der Staatsbankerott und die moderne
Rechtswissenschaft, (Berlin, 1895). Wuarin, article in Clunet, vol. 2o,
25 et seq., 42o-431.
"Kauffmann, Wilhelm. Das internationale Recht der egyptischen
Staatschuld (Berlin, i8gi). See also articles by same author in Revue de
droit international, vol. 22, 556-586; vol. 23, 48-75, 144-175, 266-316. A
bibliography on the Egyptian debt will be found in Clunet, vol. 30, 681-683.
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zuela in I9O2, her statesmen have always asserted it to be Eng-
land's policy not to interpose diplomatically in behalf of British
holders of bonds of foreign governments, though reserving their
liberty of action. The British view was expressed in its now ac-
cepted form in the celebrated circular sent by Lord Palmerston in
1848 to the British representatives in foreign states. He then de-
clared:
"It is therefore simply a question of discretion with the British
government whether this matter [the non-payment of public loans]
should or should not be taken up by diplomatic negotiation, and
the decision of that question of discretion turns entirely upon Brit-
ish and domestic considerations."
Referring to the economic disapproval of British investments
in foreign loans, as against British enterprises, he added that the
British government has
"hitherto thought it the best policy to abstain from taking up
as international questions the complaints made by British subjects
against foreign governments which have failed to make good their
engagements in regard to such pecuniary transactions . .
"But, nevertheless, it might happen that the loss occasioned to
British subjects by the non-payment of interest upon loans made
by them to foreign governments might become so great that it
would be too high a price for the nation to pay for such a warn-
ing as to the future, and in such a state of things it might become
the duty of the British government to make these matters the sub-
ject of diplomatic negotiation."8 6
Palmerston's note has occasionally been misinterpreted by
writers who use his note in support of an argument for non-inter-
vention. When he stated that interference was "for the British
government entirely a question of discretion, and by no means a
question of international right," he did not intend to cast any
doubt on the right of Great Britain to interfere (as some writers
have quoted him), but he meant that there was no question about
the right to interfere. The next sentence of the note shows this
clearly.87
"'Palmerston's circular is quoted in full by Phillimore, op. cit., I, 9-11,
and by Hall, 276-277. Other secretaries for foreign affairs of Great Bri-
tain have expressed, in language even more unreserved than that of Pal-
merston, the policy of non-interference. See for example Canning and
Aberdeen (St. Pap., 28, pp. o61, 967, 969) Russell (St. Pap., 52, pp. 237-239)
Derby, Granville (quoted by Phillimore, op cit., pp. 12-13) and Salisbury,
(cited by Hall, note p. 277). Balfour, when Prime Minister in 19o2, sup-
ported this view. See Scott's Hague Peace Conferences, vol. i, 4o2.
'See for example Gen. Porter's address of July 16, i9o7, printed sep-
arately, and quoted in Scott's Hague Peace Conferences, vol. I, 402.
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Subsequent secretaries of foreign affairs emphasizing the specu-
lative character of the transaction of subscription to a foreign loan
have declined to do more than exercise their good offices in behalf
of unpaid bondholders. Great Britain's practice of non-inter-
ference is entirely a matter of policy and is not to be construed
as the recognition of an international legal principle .1
7
The practice of non-interference of the United States on the
other hand has been not only a matter of policy, but the carrying
out of a fundamental principle that the diplomatic interposition
of the United States can not be invoked (within the recognized
limitations) in behalf of contractual claims.18 If certain revenue
or security has been set aside for the repayment of a loan, it seems
probable that the United States would, following the practice of
other nations, interpose diplomatically to prevent any diversion of
the security or the pledged revenue."9 Attorney-General Cushing
in the course of an elaborate opinion on the Texas bonds question
declared that
"A public creditor, like a private creditor, has a general right
to receive payment out of the property, income, or means of his
debtor. A special pledge of this or that source of revenue, of this
or that direct tax, when made by a government, renders such
source of revenue, like a mortgage or deed of trust given by a
private individual to his creditor, a specific lien, a fixed incum-
brance, which the government ought not in justice to the creditor,
to abolish, lessen, or alienate until the debt has been satisfied." 90
In the case of certain bonds issued by Hayti to American citi-
zens for work and materials furnished, Secretary of State Sher-
man protested against a proposed law of Hayti having in view the
conversion of the bonds at a rate greatly depreciatory of their
value.8 ' There would indeed seem to be some difference between
bonds purchased in the open market as an investment and bonds
received in payment for services and goods, in the hands of the
original parties.
87 The proposed action of Great Britain, pending at the present writing,
to dispatch a warship to Guatemala to collect the unpaid interest and
capital on bonds held by British subjects, may be charged to the bad
faith of Guatemala in diverting the security of the loan, an export tax on
coffee, to other purposes.
s'Citations noted in Moore and Wharton, supra, p. 463.
"Cases cited, supra. See also opinion of Little, commissioner, in As-
pinwall (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore's Arb., 3641-3642.
"Opinion of Sept 26, 1853, 6 Opin. Atty.-Gen., 130,143.
"Mr. Sherman, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Powell (Oct. 26, 1897) Moore's
Dig., VI, 729.
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Where the loan has been liquidated and a new agreement for
payment made, the origin of the debt seems to have been no de-
terrent against its enforcement. So in Mexico, in 1861, Lord
Russell withheld recognition of the Mexican government until
Mexico had agreed to carry out an arrangement made with Brit-
ish bondholders.9
2
Both the United States and Great Britain have authorized their
representatives abroad to receive payment for their citizen bond-
holders, as a matter of convenience both to the debtor government
and to the citizen,93 and where the bonds of one foreign govern-
ment have been wholly or largely held by the citizens of another,
the United States has on one occasion at least sanctioned the en-
deavor of the government of the creditors to effect by diplomatic
negotiation an adjustment of their claim.9 4
Dr. Drago, in advancing his doctrine as a corollary to the Mon-
roe Doctrine, had some reason to expect the approval of the United
States, not only because of its interest in the maintenance of the
Monroe Doctrine, but because of its traditional attitude in the mat-
ter of contract claims. Dr. Drago quoted from Monroe's mes-
sage that the United States
"could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing
[the countries of the American continent], or controlling in any
other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other
light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly spirit toward the
United States."9"
In Secretary of State Hay's reply to the Drago note (one of
"'cordial evasion" as Dr. Drago himself has expressed it), Mr.
Hay quoted from President Roosevelt's message of 19Ol to the
effect that
"we do not guarantee any state against punishment if it miscon-
ducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of
the acquisition of territory by any non-American power,"98
"Lord J. Russell to Sir C. Wyke (Mar. 3o, 1861) St. Pap., vol. 52,
237, 239.
'Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secy. of State, to Mr. Wright (Jan. I7, 1884)
Moore's Dig., VI, 713; Phillimore, op. cit., vol 2, 13.
'Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec'y. of State, to Mr. Wright (Jan. 17, 1884)
Moore's Dig., VI, 713. He stated, however, that the occasions on which
this had been done were not common enough to form a rule of action.
'President Monroe's Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1823) Amer. St. Pap.,
For. Rel., V, 246, 25o, quoted in Moore's Dig., VI, 401, 402. Richardson's
.essages, vol. 2, 209 et seq.
"Mr. Hay, Secy. of State, to Sefior Garcia M6rou (Feb. 17, i9o3) For.
Rel., 1903, 5-6.
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but added an unequivocal approval of arbitration of claims grow-
ing out of alleged wrongs to individuals.
Both Mr. Root, as Secretary of State, and President Roose-
velt, after the difficulties of Venezuela in 1903 and those of the
Dominican Republic in 1894 and 19o4 in endeavoring to ward
off foreign intervention, were anxious to have the question of the
use of force in the collection of contractual claims settled by the
agreement of states. Mr. Root therefore on June I8, 19o6 in-
structed the delegates of the United States to the Third American
Conference of American states at Rio Janeiro as follows:
"It has long been the established policy of the United States
not to use its armed forces for the collection of ordinary contract
debts due to its citizens by other governments."
After deprecating its injurious effect upon the welfare of weak
and disordered states, whose development ought to be encouraged
in the interests of civilization, he added:
"It is doubtless true that the non-payment of public debts may
be accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and wrong doing
or violation of treaties as to justify the use of force. This Gov-
ernment would be glad to see an international consideration of the
subject which shall discriminate between such cases and the sim-
ple non-performance of a contract with a private person, and a reso-
lution in favor of reliance upon peaceful means in cases of the
latter class."
97
He recommended, however, that as most of the American
states were still debtors and would, by such a resolution, resolve
how their creditors should act, it would be more fitting that they
should request the Hague Conference to consider the subject,
where both creditors and debtors would be assembled.
The Rio Conference made such a request, and the United
States delegation at the Hague, on instructions from Mr. Root, as
Secretary of State, brought forward a proposition to the effect
that the use of force for the collection of contract debts is not
permissible until after the justice and amount of the debt, as well
as the time and manner of payment shall have been determined by
arbitration.9 8
'Senate Doc. 365, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 41-42.
'In the Russian program of the First Peace Conference of 1899 re-
garding international arbitration, a clause bad been included providing that
arbitration shall be obligatory "in the case of differences or conflicts re-
garding pecuniary damages suffered by a state or its citizens in conse-
quence of illegal or negligent action on the part of any state or the citi-
zens of the latter." The proposition for the arbitration of pecuniary
claims was for various reasons dropped.
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Gen. Horace Porter took charge of this proposition, and made
the principal address in its support. After several amendments
to his original draft, the Conference by a vote of 39 in favor and
5 abstentions (Belgium, Roumania, Sweden, Switzerland and
Venezuela) adopted the following convention-a few states mak-
ing special reservations:
"The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed
force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Govern-
ment of one country by the Government of another country as be-
ing due to its nationals."
"This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor
State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or,
after accepting the offer, prevents any compromis from being
agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award."
While not rejecting completely the possibility of forcibly col-
lecting contract debts, the convention represents a considerable
step in advance, inasmuch as it makes the use of force conditional
upon (i) a refusal to arbitrate; (2) making a formulation of an
agreement impossible after arbitration is accepted; (3) failure to
carry out the award. These are more definite and more appro-
priate limitations than the vague terms "bad faith," "deliberate
and voluntary insolvency," etc., which we may infer even the op-
ponents of intervention and Dr. Drago would consider as justifiable
causes of intervention."9
It will be seen that this convention, popularly known as the
Porter proposition, is at once narrower and wider in scope than
the Drago doctrine. It is -narrower inasmuch as it recognizes the
ultimate legality of the use of force. As a definite check upon the
use of force in first instance, and an important extension of the
principle of international arbitration, it is to be welcomed, for
pacific blockades, threats of hostilities, and rumors of warlike
preparations, have a most disturbing effect on international com-
merce, and as General Porter showed, the disposition of neutral
states to refuse to recognize pacific blockade leads to the more
effective blockade of actual war, and as Mr. Roosevelt on a num-
ber of occasions has stated, the seizure of custom houses easily
leads to a more permanent occupation of territory. Moreover,
'A good account of the preliminary instructions and principal speeches
and proposals in connection with this convention for the limitation of the
employment of force, with appropriate quotations may be found in J. .Scott's Hague Peace Conferences, vol. i, Chap. VIII, 386-422. See also
article by G. W. Scott, supra, in 2 Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (19o8) 78-94.
The Convention in full is printed in Scott's Hague Peace Conferences,
vol. 2 (Documents) 357-361.
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the interruption of the commerce of the debtor nation diminishes
its means and opportunities to pay the very debts for which the
hostilities are undertaken and acts unfairly toward creditors of
other nations. Many of these difficulties will now be avoided.
Switzerland and Venezuela declined to sign the convention (al-
though the latter was very willing to accept the renunciation of
force) on the ground that it ousted the national courts of juris-
dictiom One can understand Switzerland's unwillingness to be
bound to arbitrate a question in which its courts, internationally
recognized as impartial, have jurisdiction.' Venezuela's protest,
which took the following form-
"recourse to arbitration should be permitted only in the case of
denial of justice after the judicial remedies of the debtor state
had been exhausted"--
is to be regarded as traditional and a force of habit. Unless its
judicial organization is acknowledged as more independent now
than in 19o2, it is unlikely that mere protests will be of any more
avail than they were in 1902. Seven other Latin-American repub-
lics, by way of reservation, joined in the objection of Venezuela.
The principal reservation was made by Dr. Drago himself, on
the part of Argentine. After declaring that ordinary contracts
should be arbitrable only in case of denial of justice after the ex-
haustion of local remedies, he added:
"Public loans with bond issues constituting the national debt
can not in any case give rise to military aggression nor to the
occupation of the soil of American states."
In this reservation Argentine was joined by Colombia, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 01
Another reservation by Peru in which Uruguay joined, sought
to protect the so-called Calvo clause from possible infringement.
The reservation reads:
"That the principles adopted in this proposition cannot be ap-
plied to claims or differences arising from contracts between the
government of one country and foreign subjects, when it has
"In theory at least the strong and well-organized states have re-
nounced an inherent right. Dr. Heinrich Pohl in the Zeitschrift ffir Politik(vol. 4, 134,138) criticizes Germany for having ratified the Porter Propo-
sition (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1910, 59-81), for he states that Germany may
sometime be a defendant state, and will be bound by the agreement to
arbitrate, thus ousting its courts of jurisdiction.
"'See table of reservations in J. B. Scott's Hague Peace Conferences,
vol 2, 532-534 and article by G. W. Scott, supra, p. 89. See also Zeitschr.
fir V8lkerr. u Bundesstaatsrecht vol. 3, 72, 73.
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been expressly stipulated that the claims or differences must be
submitted to the judges and tribunals of the contracting country."
The general futility of this clause in so far as it seeks to at-
tain the exclusive jurisdiction of local courts and the avoidance
of diplomatic interposition has been demonstrated by international
practice.
The Porter proposition is wider in scope than the Drago doc-
trine in that its provisions apply to all contractual debts, whereas
Dr. Drago confined his policy to claims arising out of the non-
payment of public loans. Nevertheless, doubt has been raised,
both in the sub-committee of the Conference and since then, as
.to the meaning of "contractual debts.'
10 2
Without entering into the various interpretations to which
the term is subject, it seems clear that it does include public loans.
There is a class of cases, however, on the contractual nature
of which there may be some doubt. When a contract has been
concluded between a government and an individual for the carry-
ing on of some public work, it has happened that a subsequent act
of the legislature, acting not as a business fiscus but as a sovereign,
diminishes the contractor's rights under the contract. National
courts, as, for example, the United States Court of Claims, have
held that the two characters which the government possesses as
a fiscus and as a sovereign are distinct and that the United States
when sued in the one character can not be made liable for acts
done in the other:
"Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or
executive, so long as they be public and general, can not be deemed
specially to alter, modify, obstruct, or violate the particular con-
tracts into which it enters with private persons."'0 3
The question arises whether these distinctions of national law
which exclude the case mentioned from the category of contractual
debts will be maintained by the international forum in the inter-
pretation of the term "contractual debts." We have seen that
foreign offices in dealing with the Latin-American Republics have
considered it as a violation of the contract and an arbitrary meas-
fure, thus to reduce the contractor's rights by a subsequent legisla-
"'A full discussion of these doubts and possible interpretations is con-
tained in Moulin, op. cit., 308-320. See also article by G. W. Scott, supra,
90-93.
" Deming v. United States, i C. C. (1865) i9o-I9i; Jones and Brown
v. United States, i C. C. (1865) 384-399; Wilson v. United States, ii C. C.
(1875) 513-522.
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tive act. It seems reasonable to assume that this will be the inter-
pretation of the term "contractual debt" by an international court.
Bond cases have come before international tribunals on several
occasions. Very little light is thrown upon the subject by the
results of these arbitrations, except as by their dicta the commis-
sions express the opinion that governments have the right to press
the claims of bondholders of a foreign debt, though they generally
admit that in practice such claims are not diplomatically presented.
As a general rule, however, jurisdiction has been declined-usu-
ally for the reason that governments are not in the habit of pre-
senting such claims diplomatically and because of the unwilling-
ness of commissions to assume that they were intended to exer-
cise jurisdiction in the absence of express words in the protocol. 10 4
It has been so held even where the protocol provided for the settle-
ment of "all claims."' 0 5 This last decision, rendered by Sir Fred-
erick Bruce, Umpire, was severely criticised by Mr. Commissioner
Little in the Aspinwall case before the United States-Venezuelan
commission of Dec. 5, 1885. He held, with Mr. Findlay, (Andrade
dissenting) that the inclusive term "all claims" embraced bond
claims. This case constitutes one important exception, prior to the
Venezuelan Arbitrations of i9o3, to the general rule thait juris-
diction over bond claims is not exercised by international com-
missions.106
"Overdue Mexican coupons, Du Pont de Nemours (U. S.) v. Mex-
ico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3616. Opinion by Wadsworth. Zamacona
concurred. See dictum of Thornton, Umpire, in Widman (U. S.) v. Mex-
ico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3467.
"Colombian Bond Cases, Riggs, Oliver, Fisher (U. S.) v. Colombia(February io, 1864) Moore's Arb., 3612-3616.
"Venezuelan Bond Cases, Aspinwall, Executor of G. G. Howland
et al (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Dec. 5, 1885) Moore's Arb., 3616-3641. This
claim was dismissed by the mixed commission under the convention of
April 25, 1866. The findings of this commission were reopened because
of the alleged fraud of the arbitrators. Under a strict construction of
the protocol, Bates, Umpire, dismissed the Texas Bond cases before the
British-U. S. Commission of Feb. 8, 1853, Moore's Arb., 3594. One
reason was that they had not been treated by Great Britain as a subject for
diplomatic interposition. The decision is criticized by Westlake, vol. 1,
77-78, citing Dana in Dana's Wheaton, §30, n. 18. Jurisdiction was exer-
cised by the Mexican Commission of i868 over a stolen bond, Keller (U.
S.) v. Mexico (July 4, 1868) Moore's Arb., 3065 on the ground of fraudu-
lent destruction of specific property having a definite value, and certain
assurances by the Government. See also Eldredge (U. S.) v. Peru (Jan.
12, 1863) Moore's Arb., 3462. The failure to fulfill the obligations of a
bond issued for supplies was held not an "injury to property" by the
U. S.-Mexican Commission of i868 (Manasse case, Moore's Arb., 3463)
although the failure to pay for supplies furnished under contract had
been so construed.
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Before the Venezuelan commissions, sitting at Caracas, four
bond claims were presented, with various decisions. In the case of
the Comp. G6n6rale des Eaux de Caracas (Belgium),1O°7 Venezuelan
bonds payable to bearer had been issued to the corporation for cer-
tain public works. From the decision, it would seem that the
general rule of non-enforcement of bond claims may be held not
applicable where the bonds are issued in payment of property
rights transferred to the Government. Although many of the
stockholders were not Belgians, an award was made, with the pecu-
liar provision that the money should be deposited in a Belgian
bank and the bonds paid on being turned in. The production of
the bonds naturally was made a necessary condition for the making
of an award, so where, in the case of Ballistini (France) 10 8 the
original bonds were not produced, the claim was dismissed, Paul,
Commissioner, in a dictum, giving expression to the usual rule of
the non-enforcement of bond claims before international com-
missions. In the case of Boccardo (Italy) 0 9 where national bonds
were delivered to claimant in payment for articles furnished and
were never transferred by him, judgment was rendered on the
authority of the Aspinwall case before the Venezuelan Commission
of 1885. The fourth case Jarvis (U. S.)"' was dismissed because
the service and supplies for which the bonds were issued (by a
temporary dictator of Venezuela), were rendered to an unsuccess-
ful revolution which had not been recognized by the government
of the United States, and hence presumably they were not valid
obligations of Venezuela.
The United States, in its endeavor to be consistent with the
maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine and with the declaration of
President Roosevelt that that doctrine could not be used by any
nation of this continent to shield it from the consequences of its
own misdeeds, has at times been placed in the most delicate posi.
tion when foreign nations have attempted to seek redress for the
alleged violation of international rights. So in the settlement of
numerous difficulties between European nations and Latin-Ameri-
'1Comp. G~n6rale des Eaux de Caracas (Belgium) v. Venezuela (March
7, I9O3) Ralston I, 27i-29o.
'cSBalistini (France) v. Venezuela (Feb. 27, I9O3) Ralston I, 5o3-5o6.
10Boccardo (Italy) v. Venezuela (Feb. 13, 1903) cited in note to
Ralston I, 505 (not reported). See, however, the brief statement given
by Mr. Ralston in his address before the International Law Association,
24th Report, I93-194.
.. Jarvis (U. S.) v. Venezuela (Feb. 17, I9O3) Ralston I, i45-i5I.
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can, states arising out of pecuniary claims, the United States has
had an active interest. Especially where the occupation of
American territory seemed imminent, the United States, by virtue
of its responsibilities under the Monroe doctrine, has felt called
upon to undertake what may be called friendly intervention to pre-
vent such occupation and yet satisfy the creditor nationb.
President Roosevelt in his message to Congress of Dec. 5,
1905, stated these embarrassing conditions, pointing out at the same
time the method by which relief from this critical situation could
be most equitably and practically secured. In his message he
said:
"Our own Government has always refused to enforce such con-
tractual obligations on behalf of its citizens by an appeal to arms.
It is much to be wished that all foreign governments would take
the same view. But they do not; and in consequence we are liable
at any time to be brought face to face with disagreeable alterna-
tives. On the one hand, this country would certainly decline to
go to war to prevent a foreign government from collecting a just
debt; on the other hand, it is very inadvisable to permit any foreign
power to take possession, even temporarily, of the custom-houses
of an American Republic in order to enforce the payment of its
obligations; for such temporary occupation might turn into a per-
manent occupation. The only escape from these alternatives may
at any time be that we must ourselves undertake to bring about
some arrangement by which so much as possible of a just obliga-
tion shall be paid. It is far better that this country should put
through such an arrangement, rather than allow any foreign coun-
try to undertake it. To do so insures the defaulting republic from
having to pay debts of an improper character under duress, while
it also insures honest creditors of the republic from being passed
by in the interest of dishonest or grasping creditors.""'
This method of administering the finances of bankrupt and un-
stable governments has in fact been applied in the Dominican Re-
public. In 1905, it was effective in restraining the forcible attempt
of Germany, Spain and Italy to secure payment of arrears of in-
terest and pledged revenues to their subject creditors. Interna-
tional practice seems to have given a sanction to this form of inter-
vention. It might be called benevolent intervention in the interests
of the debtor state and of its creditors, and however the paternal
control of the temporary guardian may hurt the pride of the citi-
zens of the bankrupt nation, the advantages resulting to world peace
exceed by far such minor disadvantages as the disapproval of a
few patriotic nationals. Nevertheless, in the absence of an inter-
"'For. Re., i9o5, H. Doc. I, 59th Cong., Ist Sess., 34-35.
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national forum it does not seem apparent how grossly exaggerated
claims against these states can be avoided, for presumably the
financial administration looks only to the payment of the current
expenses and of the national debts and makes no provision for the
judicial examination of the legitimacy of the latter. The proposed
treaties of the United States with Honduras and Nicaragua which
were invited by these two states, may be taken as indicating the
policy of the Department of State, at least under the Taft admin-
istration, to secure the financial rehabilitation of the Latin Ameri-
can countries by the institution of a temporary receivership which
shall reassure foreign creditors and maintain the peace and pros-
perity of these small Republics under the most favorable terms.
The incidental fostering of American investment in the foreign
loan should be considered a national advantage. If the treaties
do remove from the field of international conflict what has hitherto
been an annoying source of difficulty, they are more than justified,
and the minor domestic objections which have interfered with
their ratification by the Senate should not be permitted to stand
in the way of their ultimate effective operation.112
"'European countries have adopted practices of various kinds to assure
the successful operation of a loan contract concluded between a foreign
nation and their subjects. Thus Great Britain has provided in such cases
for the selection of a British supervisor of the loan and the government
"takes cognizance" of the contract. As in the Dominican and the proposed
Honduras and Nicaraguan treaties, diplomatic protection is extended to
the receiver or supervisor in the performance of his duties. See the
treaties between the United States and Dominican Republic, Feb. 7, 1907,
Honduras, Jan. 26, 19ii, and Nicaragua, June 8, 1gii. See also editorial
comment on the treaties in Amer. Journ. of Int. Law (1911) io46-io5i.
A discussion of the treaties by Sec'y. of State Knox is contained in his
speech before the New York State Bar Association (1912) 311-318. An
elaborate explanation and justification of the policy of the United States
in negotiating the treaties is to, be found in President Roosevelt's message
in connection with the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, Con-
fidential Executive, V, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess. See also speeches incident
to the visit of Philander C. Knox to the countries of the Caribbean, Feb.
23 to April 17, 1912 (Washington, 1913, Ch. III and IV). France has no
objection to "dollar diplomacy." It uses its subject's foreign loans to
foster its commercial interests. Speech of M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies, Jan. 13, 19H. Journal Officiel, Jan.
14, 1911. However much we may be in sympathy with the action of the
present administration in withdrawing from the Chinese loan, it is to be
hoped that the administration will not extend its disapproval of the
much-abused term "dollar diplomacy" to the point of suppressing the
Honduran and Nicaraguan treaties. The pending threat of Great Britain
to dispatch a warship to Guatemala to secure the payment of debts and
the resulting appeal of Guatemala to the United States presents a familiar
situation in our Latin-American relations. By reason of the Monroe
Doctrine, we cannot avoid an active concern in the adjustment of these
difficulties, and had better sanction a method of peaceful administrative
supervision most conformable to the interests of all parties concerned.
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The Porter proposition is by no means a complete remedy for
existing evils, except in so far as it protects a debtor state from
the immediate use of force. It still permits of much injustice to
the debtor nation, inasmuch as claims are still presented on ex
parte evidence without a judicial examination of the merits of the
case. Experience has shown that claims are generally greatly
exaggerated. Again, the creditor's national government is not
required to arbitrate. The failure to make or accept the offer of
arbitration simply precludes the use of force in first instance, but
not the use of other methods of oppression. Experience has shown
that it is only against weak states that governments will interpose
to secure the payment of contract debts. Again, there is a ques-
tion whether the debtor government can demand arbitration. 113
This should certainly be made possible.
On the other hand the unpaid creditor has no individual right
to bring about the adjustment of his claim. The action of his
government in his behalf depends upon political considerations and
is entirely a matter of expediency and policy. If his government
for any reason declines to become interested in his case or to
espouse his claim against the foreign government, the creditor is
without a remedy. A legal right of the individual may therefore
be sacrificed to the political expediency of his government. With
the constant growth of international contractual relations between
individuals and foreign governments the fulfillment and enforce-
ment of legal obligations toward individuals should be divorced
from political considerations. The difference in the practice of
governments in the support of contract claims gives an unequal
advantage to the nationals of some states and correspondingly em-
barrasses the governments whose policy or practice it is to decline
diplomatic pressure in such cases.
These various defects of the system as it still exists with its
possibilities of injustice either to the debtor state or the unpaid
creditor or both, lend much weight to the proposal advanced with
greatest emphasis in Germany, that an international court be cre-
ated by international agreement for the adjustment of these es-
sentially legal claims. The individual should be given the right
to bring suit against the debtor nation before this international
tribunal, as has been done in the convention for the establishment
of an international prize court and in the treaty of Washington
'O. Nippold in Ztschr. ffir internationales privat. u 6ffentliches Recht,
vol. i8, 26o.
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for the establishment of a Central-American Court of Arbitration.
The creditor will be assured of a hearing, the debtor state will be
secured against the pressure of exorbitant claims accompanied by
disagreeable diplomatic coercion, the government of the claimant
will avoid what is always a potential germ of international difficul-
ties and ill-will with the incidental expense of pressing a diplo-
matic claim, and the peace of the world will be fostered by the
removal of one great source of international conflict. The details
of the organization and operation of this international court may
be left to the delegates of the Third Hague Peace Conference, who
may profitably examine the proposals of several learned Ger-
mans.""4 The prospect and opportunity for thus advancing the
cause of international justice, toward which goal the Porter propo-




'See the Denkschrift or memorial of the Altesten der Kaufmannschaft
von Berlin to the Imperial Chancellor Sept. 30, i9io, reprinted in Nie-
meyer's Zeitschrift ffir internationales Recht, vol. 20, 594-599, and the
Denkschrift of May 2o, 1912, summing up the whole matter, reprinted in
Berliner Jahrbuch ffir Handel and Industrie, 497-514. See also the fol-
lowing works: Freund, G. S. Der Schutz der Glfubiger (Berlin, i91o)
§ 5, 43 et seq. Wehberg, Hans. Ein internationaler Gerichtshof fiir
Privat-klagen (Berlin, 19ri) in which plans for the organization and op-
eration of an international tribunal are carefully worked out. Fischer,
Otto. Die Verfolgung verm6gensrechtlicher Anspriiche gegen aus-
lindische Staaten (Leipzig, I912) and references to the proposals of
others mentioned on pp. 15-16. See also a further note by Professor
Fischer in Ztschr. f. dentschen Zivilprozess, vol. 43, 282-284, and works
already cited, Meili, Staatsbankerott, etc., 41, 50, 58, 59 and 63 and Pflug,
58-70.
